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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case Number: 20140148-CA

V.

JANIES C. ?v1CCALLIE

Defendant/ Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony in
the Third District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable, Denise P. Lindberg,
Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. \tVhether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Mr.
JVIcCallie's motion for mistrial and motion for new trial when the
prosecutor argued that the jury could infer guilt from l\!Ir. McCallie's right
to silence.
a. Standard of Review: "When reviewing a [district] court's denial of a
motion for a new trial, we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of
discretion by the [district] court." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,

~

12,

994 P.2d 177 (internal quotations omitted). "At the same time,

1

however, we review the legal standards applied by the [district] court
in denying the motion for correctness." State v. Nlartin, 2002 UT 34,

1

45, 44 P.3d 805.
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. McCallie made a motion for
mistrial and renewed his objection in a motion for new trial. R. 22325; 298 : 121.
2. vVhether the trial court erroneously denied Mr. l\ticCallie's motion for a
directed verdict given that the State's entire case hinged on the testimony of
a person whose blood alcohol limit effectively prevented him from
accurately remembering events.
a. Standard of R eview: "This court's standard of review of a directed
verdict is the same as that imposed upon a trial court," in that the
motion will only be granted if there is "no competent evidence that
would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Nlerino v.

Albertsons) Inc., 1999 UT 14,

1 3,

975 P.2d 467 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. McCallie made a motion for a
directed verdict on this basis. R. 298:28.

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are
Addendum A and B.

2

111

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 5, 2013, a warrant issued for i\!Ir. McCaUie. R. 3-4. The State
filed an amended information l\1ay 1, 20 13. R. 19-21. The case was tried to a jury
October 2 and 3, 2013 who acquitted l\!lr. iVIcCallie on the major charge,
discharge of a firearm, but convicted him of aggravated assault, a third degTee
felony. R. 138-39; 297-98. l\!Ir. iVIcCallie was sentenced December 16, 2013 and
the judgment entered that same day. R . 214-15. Mr. l\!IcCaUie filed a motion for
new trialjanuary 3, 20 14 and the court denied that motion February 11, 2014. R.
223-25; 262-63 . Mr. McCallie filed a notice of appeal to this court the next day,

February 12, 2014. R. 264-65.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case involves an evening among individuals playing cribbage and
poker as well as heavy drinking. According to the State's version of events, Mr.
iVIcCallie insulted John Pearce's aunt, and while highly intoxicated, pulled a gun
on Pearce in the hallway. The gun discharged in an ensuing struggle, hitting
Pearce. Mr. McCallie insisted that Pearce, who had been drinking for ten hours
and had a blood alcohol level of .3 1, attacked him in his bedroom and that, while
McCallie pulled the gun in self-defense, Pearce tripped the trigger while they were
struggling over the gun on the bed.
The jury ultimately acquitted l\1r. McCaUie of discharging the weapon, but
found that he committed an aggravated assault for brandishing the gun.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Nir. NicCallie refused to answer questions when he was arrested and taken
to the police station . The State took great pains to avoid using Mr. McCallie's
silence against him during the trial, as it openly acknowledged a few times in the
trial. However, during closing argument, the State argued that Nir. NicCallie failed
to tell his story to the police when he was questioned and that this failure was an
indication of his guilt. This violated Nir. McCallie's constitutional right to remain
silent because the State used his silence to infer a motive to fabricate his story.
Additionally, the State's entire case hinged on the testimony of one person,
J ohn Pearce . Pearce's blood alcohol level turned out to be .31, four times the legal
limit and one in which the scientific literature deems a person almost completely
incapable of remembering what occurred. In other words, no rational trial finder
could believe Pearce's story. Pearce could not concretely remember virtually any
detail of the crime and made several statements soon after indicating that he could
not remember what had transpired. Additionally, Pearce's story was flatly
contradicted by the evidence from the scene. No bullet hole matched his story, and
the only apparent bullet hole in the room was behind and above where Pearce said
Nlr. McCallie stood. Thus, the court erred in denying Mr. NicCallie's motion for a
directed verdict.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court abused its discretion in
denying Mr. McCallie's motion for mistrial
and motion for new trial, given the State's
comments regarding Mr. McCallie's exercise
of his right to remain silent

Prior to trial, Mr. NicCallie made a motion in limine to prevent the State
from referencing a police interview where Nir. NlcCallie refused to answer
questions and where he told police he did not understand the 1\lliranda warnings. R.
-

297: I. The prosecutor responded, "I spoke to my detective about that very point.
As we went over the interview I said, Look, you don't want to go anywhere near,
that can be cast as us commenting on his right to remain silent." R. 297: 1. The
State continued, saying that it wanted to question the officer about Mr. McCallie's
behavior- that he "was uncooperative, combative" and "smartalecky" with the
police. R. 297:2 . The State said,

I would like to have the D etec tive [Arnn] testify as to his behavior
but we 're not going to go into the content and I told him specifically
and I'll reiterate to him, we do not want to go around Nliranda, I'm
not going to ask that. All I want to ask you about is how was he
behaving.
R. 297:2. The court admonished the State that "behavioral descriptions of what he
observed ... should be acceptable. " R. 297:2 .
\!\Th en Detective Arnn testified, the State said to him, in reference to his
interview of Nfr. McCallie, "I'm not going in to what was said specifically but I
want to ask you questions about the man as you saw him ... " R. 297: 130. Later,

5

the State, in asking whether Mr. McCallie could articulate himself or was
intoxicated, said to the detective, "When you spoke with - again without going into
the content - with the defendant did he have that same clarity?" R. 297: 131. The
State asked no further questions regarding the intervievv with Mr. l\!IcCallie and
only elicited the officer's opinion that in his few minutes of interaction, l\!Ir.
McCallie appeared intoxicated. R. 29 7: 131-3 2.
l\!Ir. l\!IcCallie testified, and as a result of that testimony, the State elicited
some of his statements, such as he asked police for a rum and Coke and a six pack
of beer. R . 298:64-65. Additionally, when the officer asked l\!Ir. Mc Callie about his
Afiranda rights , Mr. McCallie responded that he didn't understand " [t]he part

where yo u're fucking j erking me off ·vvhat the fuck am I doing here to begin with?
You people woke me up." R. 298:65.
During the State's closing argument, the State changed course, opting to
argue that l\!Ir. McCallie 's silence entitled the jury to infer his guilt. The prosecutor
was in the process of arguing that l\!Ir. McCallie's story evolved over time. R.
298: 119-20. H e then made the following, objectionable, statement:
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when [the police]
questioned him, what does he say? vVhy am I here? \!\Thy are you
j erking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up. You woke me
up. He didn 't say it was an accident. H e doesn't say this was selfdefense.
R. 298: 120. The defense objected that this was "a comment on my client's right to

remain silent" and moved for mistrial. R. 298: 12 1. The trial court summarily
denied the motion. R . 298: 121.
6

After trial, Mr. :tvfcCallie filed a motion for new trial based on the improper
comment. R. 223-25 . The motion mentioned that Mr. McCallie "refused to
answer the questions of the police when he was arrested" and that "refusal was
tantamount to invoking his right to remain silent under the constitutions of Utah
and the United States." R. 223. NicCallie argued that "[i]n order to ... sway the
jury into believing that the Defendant was fabricating a defense, [the prosecutor]
stated that the Defendant did not tell the police when he was arrested that he had
acted in self-protection or that the shooting was an accident." R. 223-24. Nfr.
McCallie also alleged that the court failed to issue a curative instruction. R. 224.
McCallie alleged that the error was particularly harmful given serious
inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. R. 224; see point II, ir!fi·a. Because the
jury's only determination involved the credibility of two people, and where the
physical evidence did not comport with the victim's story but with McCallie's
story, " the prosecutor had to impugn the Defendant and his testimony in order to
convince the jury of guilt. He did that by stating that if his testimony and defenses
were worthy of belief that he would have told the police when he was arrested." R.
224. Without a corrective instruction, this left the jury with the impression that this
was proper basis to infer guilt. R . 224.
The State admitted that it "argued that Defendant was gwen an
opportunity to tell the police what had occurred on the night in question and
instead of saying it was an accident or that it was in self-defense, as he claimed at
trial, Defendant was confused why police were even there and told them 'nothing

7

happened."' R. 252. It also asserted that l\!Ir. McCallie had not "invoke[d] his
right to remain silent at this point." R. 252. The State then argued that Mr.
McCallie's statement to the police that "nothing happened," coupled with later
statements (that it was an accident and that it was self-defense) amounted to
"proper argument" to show that l\!Ir. lVIcCallie was "not credible and his claim of
self-defense should not be believed." R . 253.
The court denied the motion, stating that the comment was "an
appropriate comment" on l\!Ir. lVIcCallie's credibility "given inconsistencies in
defendant's prior statements to the police and others." R. 262. Additionally, the
court found that Mr. lVIcCallie's refusal to talk to the police did not amount to an
invocation of the right to remain silent, since it believed the right must be invoked
unequivocally. R. 262.
The trial court erred in allowing the State to use Mr. lVIcCallie's silence as a
basis to infer his guilt. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
says, "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. ... " U .S. Const. amend. V. This right "can be claimed in any proceeding,
be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory .. ..

[I] t protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be
used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be
so used." State v. Gallup, 2011 UT App 422', ~ 14, 267 P.3d 289 (quoting State v.

Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 34 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)).

8

The State's use of Mr. NicCallie's silence as evidence of his guilt violates his
right against self-incrimination and was a critical error requiring reversal. "The
general rule of law is that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is
impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which
defendant exercised." United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 11 96, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991 ).
As the Supreme Court has held, "the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment
by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt." Griffinu. California, 380 U .S. 609,6 15, 85 S.Ct. 1229,
1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965).
The State's comment that Mr. McCallie's silence indicated some sort of
guilt was clearly improper. See State v. Easter) 130 v\Tash . 2d 228, 235, 922 P.2d
1285, 1289 (1996) ("the State may not elicit comments from witnesses or make
closing arguments relating to a defendant's silence to infer guilt from such
silence"). As the Supreme Court has held, "the use for impeachment purposes of
petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings,
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. " Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U .S. 610,6 19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976).
Indeed, in Doyle, the State sought to make the exact inference that it made
in this case, which the Court found to be improper. The State argued " that the
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at' trial and silence at time of arrest gives
rise to an inference that the story was fabricated somewhere along the way,
perhaps to fit within the seams of the State's case as it was developed at pretrial

9

hearings." Id. at 616. The State did nothing different in this case. It argued that
Mr. McCallie made up the story later, otherwise he would have shared it at the
time of interrogation. This is clearly prohibited.

In State v. Wiswell, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction for a
similar comment. In that case, the prosecutor argued to the jury that "I asked the
officer who drove him to those places what the defendant said. He didn't tell the
officer that he was an unwilling participant." State v. T1Viswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147
(Utah 1981 ). The court reversed the conviction, noting that the "prosecutor's
comments during his final argument" was an attempt "by the prosecutor to put the
defendant's silence before the jury after his having been advised of his right to
remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct." Id. As this court has put it,
A prosecutor must specifically inquire about or argue using a
defendant's exercise of his rights in a context that would impeach a
defendant's exculpatory explanation of his conduct. The key is the
framing of a question or a prosecutor's comment that demands an
explanation from the defendant and raises the inference that silence
equals guilt.

State v. Jvlaas, 1999 UT App 325,

,r 20, 991

P.2cl 1108, 1112. The problem is when

"the prosecution . . . attempt[s] to cast the forbidden inference that [the
defendant's] silence equaled guilt." Id.,

,r 25.

That is exactly what occurred here.

The prosecutor took Mr. NlcCallie's silence and used it to make an inference that
he was lying, and thus, guilty-that if his sto_ry was correct, he would have told the
police.

10

Nor was the trial court correct in stating that a defendant must affirmatively
invoke the right to remain silent in order to claim it. One easily invokes one's Fifth
Amendment right when he chooses to remain silent. "[I]t is difficult to see how
remaining silent is not an exercise of one's right to remain silent." Gallup, 2011 UT
App 422,

~

32 (V oros,J. , concurring);~ 15 ("the Jvfiranda warning itself is framed as

a right to remain silent, implying that the right to be silent exists before a Jvliranda
vvarning is necessary") (emphasis in original). In Gallup, the State argued that it
could use a defendant's hanging up the phone as evidence against him. Id. ,~ 17.
This court found that it put the defendant in a Catch-22, to either "speak with the
trooper or to remain silent" and that the court prejudicially erred in admitting the
defendant's silence against him. Id. at~~ 17-18, 25; see also Palmer, 860 P.2d 339.
The trial court's reliance on 17zompkins was misplaced. In that case, the
defendant remained largely silent for a few hours during an interrogation, but then
later spoke with police. Berglzuis v. 17zompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 375-76, 130 S. Ct.
2250, 2263, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). He argued to the Court that the period of
silence amounted to an invocation of the right to remain silent for purposes of

Jvfiranda, which would have required police to cut off the interrogation. Id. at 38081. The Court disagreed, saying that police are not required to end an
interrogation if a defendant only remains silent. Id. at 381. Had the defendant said
either that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the
police, "he would have invoked his 'right to cut off questioning." ' Id. at 382.
Certainly, in dealing w-ith the police, a defendant must unambiguously tell them

11

that he is invoking his right to silence so that they cease questioning. But if a
defendant chooses to remain silent in the interrogation (and never speaks with the
police), then he has, by definition, chosen to exercise the right as the police
informed him.
This question is opposite to J\!Ir. :M cCallie's case for several reasons. In this
case, first, Mr. J\llcCallie did not later choose to speak with the police, as the
defendant did in 17wmpkins. He refused- he remained silent. As the Court put it,
" [i]f Thompkins wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response to {police}

questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his lvliranda rights and ended the
interrogation." Thompkins, 560 U.S . at 386. Thus, the Court found that by later
speaking, Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. Id. at 385. J\!Ir. McCallie
did not later speak, and thus, his did not waive a right to remain silent.
Second, Mr. J\llcCallie's Miranda violation is different. Thompkins argued
that he invoked J\lliranda by silence and that subsequent statements to police were
involuntarily given. J\!Ir. :McCallie invoked lvliranda by remaining silent once he was
subject to police questioning. He never spoke to police again. Mr. J\!IcCallie's
argument is focused to that point. He chose to remain silent when faced with
police questioning and that the State later used that silence against him at trial.
This is a fundamentally different question than the Court addressed in Tizompkins.
l\!Ir. l\llcCallie was harmed for the reasons stated in his motion and for the

reasons stated in Point II, irifi·a. The issue in this case is that the prosecutor used
Mr. McCallie's silence as evidence of his guilt. As the Utah Supreme Court has

12

held, "when a person invokes his constitutional rights, the prosecution should not
comment thereon, nor so use it in any way that will tend to impair or destroy that
privilege." State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1980). The problem occurs
when something is "implied or argued regarding any inference to be drawn" from
a defendant's silence. State v. Demartinis, 2008 UT App 261, *2 (unpublished); see

Urias, 609 P.2cl at 1328 ("It is significant that there is no indication that the
prosecutor made any attempt to use that fact to cast any inference of guilt of the
defendant, nor to persuade the jury to do so"). "The prosecutor may not in his
closing arguments, ma[k]e any further mention of [the defendant's] silence." State

v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 4.-5,

~

67, 979 P.2d 799, 820.

As this court has stated, there are particular harms w-ith using post-Jvliranda
silence against a defendant. "[T] he prosecution may not use a defendant's post-

Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt" because its "use of post-Jvliranda
silence prejudices the defendant by attempting to create an inference of guilt in the
jury's mind." State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532 , 534- (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal
citation, quotation and corrections omitted) (citing State v. Saunders, 98 Ohio
App.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d 587 , 590 (1994) (noting effect of prosecutor's comment
was to suggest guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would not have
remained silent").

In Byrd, this court found that a ·prosecutor's cross-examination of a
defendant improperly commented on his right to silence. Byrd, 937 P.2d at 537. In
Byrd, the prosecutor solicited from an officer that the defendant remained silent

13

during police questioning, then asked the defendant, "You certainly did not say
anything to [the police] about [your story], did you?" Id. at 535. This was harmful
error, this court found .
To determine whether the State's improper use of defendant's silence
was harmless, we consider the follO\,ving factors: "(1) whether the jury
vvould 'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as referring
to defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence
of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; and (4)
whether the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any adverse
presumption from defendant's [silence]." State v. R9es, 861 P.2d
1055, 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

Id. As to the first point, this court found that the questioning "clearly referred to
defendant's failure, follovving the J\lliranda warnings, to deny involvement in the
drug transaction" and amounted to a comment on his silence. Id. at 536. Like Byrd,
the State's comment specifically mentioned that when questioned, Mr. McCallie
did not tell the police his version of events. R . 298: 120. This was clearly a
comment on his silence .
As to the second point, the court emphasized that " [c] ourts have generally
refused, however, to conclude that evidence was overwhelming in cases that
ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, particularly where
the defendant's credibility is involved." Byrd, 937 P.2cl at 536. In Byrd, " [b]ecause
both the State and defendant offered conflicting versions of the events surrounding
the drug transaction and arrest, [and] th\ case came "down to a one-on-one
situation, i.e., the word of the defendant against the word of the key prosecution
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witness[es]" ... we cannot say that the evidence against defendant in this case was
overwhelming." Id.
Similarly, the case came down to the credibility of two witnesses, one of
whom was highly intoxicated-to the point of incapacitation-and whose
testimony was contradicted by virtually all of the physical evidence. Indeed, the
jury did not believe the victim's claim about the discharge of the firearm.
However, if the jury believed that it was proper to infer guilt as to the assault from
Mr. McCallie's decision to remain silent-to not tell the police his story-then this
improperly tipped the scales against Nlr. NicCallie. In other words, if the jury
believed that if Nlr. McCallie truly fired in self-defense and that the gun
ac_cidentally discharged, but that if this story were true, he would have told the
police initially, as the State argued, then they would have rejected his claim on an
improper basis.
As to the third point, the court found that even though the prosecutor made
only two short references to the silence, given that the case lasted only two days,
that the comments came close to the end of the case, and that the court failed to
instruct the jury to disregard the comment, the evidence "weigh [eel] against the
State on this factor." Id. at 536-3 7. Similarly, in this case the comment came
literally minutes before the jury retired to deliberate. It was almost the last thing
said to them. Because this case also onl)' lasted two days, and because the
comment came so close to deliberations, like Byrd, it was particularly egregious.

15

The court's failure to issue a curative instruction was also problematic. In
one case, this court again found harm with the State's solicitation of evidence of a
defendant's silence at trial, and noted the particular problem with not curatively
instructing the jury. "Although the elicited comment was isolated and was not
referred to in closing argument, the trial court did not immediately admonish the
jury to disregard it," the court found. Reyes, 861 P. 2d at 105 7.
As this court emphasized in Gallup, JVIr. JVIcCallie was placed in a Catch-22.
Had Mr. JVIcCallie decided to talk to the police, then any statements he made
could have been used against him. If he decided not to talk to the police, as is his
right under the Constitution, then the State still could, and in fact, did, use his
silence against him. JVIr. NicCallie should have the protection of the Constitution
which prevents the State from using his silence adversely at trial. See Tortolito v.

State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 CWyo. 1995) ("a citizen who stands mute in the face of
accusatory interrogation about the crime during a law enforcement investigation
and inquiry is without constitutional protection against law enforcement personnel
who treat silence as probative evidence of guilt"). Thus, the court erred in failing to
grant the motion for mistrial.
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POINT II
The trial court erred in failing to grant Mr.
McCallie's motion for acquittal and directed
verdict given the victim's highly intoxicated
state and contradictions in the physical
evidence

After the State rested, the defense made a motion for directed verdict based
on insufficiency of the evidence. R . 298:28. In particular, the defense claimed that
the Pearce "was so under the influence that no reasonable jury could believe his
testimony." R. 298:28 . The court denied the motion, reasoning that "the State has
made its prima facie case" and that questions as to Pearce's intoxication went to
the weight of his testimony. R. 298:28. The State, however, failed to make out its
prima facie case because the evidence, which depended entirely on Pearce's
testimony, was based on a non-existent memory from extreme intoxication, and
was so contradictory to the physical evidence, as to be utterly non-persuasive.

A. ST AND ARDS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
"'A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand. "'

State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23,

1 14, 210

P.3d 288. Further, "a defendant need not

adduce any evidence in his defense unless the prosecution first adduces believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524
(Utah 1983). A "motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the
State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant
must proceed with ... his defense." State v. .Noren, 74 P.2d 568, 5 70 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted). "In order to submit a question to the jury, it is necessary that
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the prosecution present some evidence, of every element needed to make out a
cause of action. " Id. (citation omitted). "\tVhen it appears to the court that there is
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order
him discharged." Utah Code Ann. § 77 -17-3 (2008)); see Utah R. Crim. P. l 7(p).
This court will hold that th ere was insufficient evidence if "after viewing the
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74,~ 18, l0P.3d 346 (quotingStatev.Dunn,85 0P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)) .

B. JOHN PEARCE'S TESTIMONY
Pearce was the only person other than Nir. NicCallie present during the
crime . According to Pearce, he showed up to visit his aunt and uncle, Tim and
J ody Krogh, around 9 am, bringing a half-gallon of whiskey. R. 297 :16-17. The
three played cribbage and drank for several hours until sometime late afternoon
when Mr. NicCallie, who rented a bedroom in the house, showed up with a 12 or
18 pack of beer. R. 297: 18-19, 23. l\!Ir. NicCallie sat at the table with them and
drank some beer and whiskey and chit chatted, but did not play. R. 297 : 18- 19.
At some moment, Mr. McCallie called Pearce's aunt a "cunt" and said it
stood for "can't understand normal thinking." R. 297 : 19-20 . They started arguing.
T im asked Mr. McCallie to apologize and l\!Ir. lVIc'Callie refused. R . 297 :20. The
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game finished and Tim andJody went to bed-around 8 or 9 pm. R. 297:21 . Nlr.
McCallie and Pearce continued to play poker and drink whiskey for several hours.
R. 297:21-22, 43.

The two began to argue again about the earlier insult and Pearce told t\!lr.
NicCallie that he disrespected his family. According to Pearce, Mr. NicCallie said
to "go fuck myself' and refused to apologize . R. 297:22. Pearce's uncle Tim then
came out of his bedroom and told the two to quiet down. R. 297:22 . By the time
they had the argument, Pearce had been drinking "[r]oughly maybe 10 hours or
better." R. 297:33.
Mr. NlcCallie then told Pearce to come into his bedroom for a shot of
brandy. As the two walked toward the bedroom, talking about golfing, Nlr.
:NicCallie turned around, just at the foot of the bed, pointed a gun at Pearce and
said, "How about I just fuckin' kill you?" R. 297:22-23, 35-36, 40. Pearce watched
him pull back the hammer and point the gun at his face, about six inches away. R.
297:24.

Pearce testified he "grabbed his vvrist and the barrel of the gun and tried to
pull it away from me ... " R. 297:24. During that struggle the gun came "clown
into my side and then the gun went off" R. 297:24. The whole struggle took
"Q]ess than a second" and the gun went off in "the blink of an eye"-it "was all
instantaneous." R. 297:27 . Pearce said the gun burned his hand as it went off R.
297:31.
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The bullet went through Pearce's side through the front and out the back
and should have been somewhere in the room. R. 297:27-29, 40. The two
struggled and Pearce spun l\!Ir. McCallie to the bed, "put my knee on his arm"
and screamed for help. R. 297:29. Pearce said that when the police showed up, he
told Mr. McCallie that he would tell them it was an accident if l\!Ir. McCallie let go
of the gun, which he did. R. 297:30.

C. TESTIMONY OF TIM AND JODY KROGH

Tim Krogh testified that Pearce had been there all day drinking whiskey
and that he played cards with him for some of the day. R. 297:73-75. He heard
l\!IcCallie insult his wife, but he stayed with them for an hour or so, while the two
calmed down and l\!IcCallie played the guitar. R. 297:83-84. He heard l\!Ir.
McCallie and Pearce arguing around 10 pm and that he told them to be quiet and
that Pearce needed to not come by anymore and that l\!IcCallie would have to find
a new place to live the next morning. R. 297:67-68. Tim went back again, but said
the two were only being loud and boisterous, not arguing. R. 297:77 -78 . He heard
the gunshot and ran to l\llcCallie's bedroom, seeing Pearce with his left knee on
McCallie's left hand which held the gun, and Pearce's right hand on the gun's
barrel. R. 297 :68-70, 80. Pearce's left hand held l\!Ir. McCallie's other wrist. R.
297:69-70. Pearce said he had been shot. R. 297:70. In the ten seconds Tim saw
the scene, he said it looked like a one-sided struggle with Pearce on top of
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l\licCallie. R. 297 :71-72. Jody showed up and Tim pushed her back and called
911. R. 297:71 .
Jody Krogh testified that the men were being loud that evening and they
woke her up. R. 297 :87-88 . vVhen she confronted them about it, l\!Ir. l\licCallie
called h er names, which made Pearce upset. R. 297:88-89 . She heard Tim asking
them to leave, and later heard the gunshot. R. 297 :90-91. She saw the two
struggling briefly. R. 297:90.

D. TESTIMONY OF DETECTIVE ARNN

Detective Arnn visited Pearce in the hospital within an hour of the shooting.
R. 297 : 107, 11 7. He took a short statement from him, which he had no difficulty
understanding. R. 297: 110-11. Pearce did not seem to slur his words. R. 297:112.
Arnn returned to the scene and secured the gun and ammunition. R. 297: 11 7-21.
Arnn locked for a projectile, but could not find one. R. 297: 126-27. They
found a "spot on the wall" in the bedroom that "was fairly high" that could have
been a bullet hole. R. 297 : 127. "There appeared to be a hole in the drywall which
appeared consistent with may have been caused by a projectile." R. 297:128. Arnn
used a Saws-All to dig into the wall, but only fou nd several two by fours and no
projectile in the wood. R. 297 : 128, 140-41. Arnn saw an indentation on the wood
which was "consistent enough" with a bullet hole that prompted him to dig. R.
297: 143-44. Arnn admitted that it was "very possible" that the "bullet hit that
wood and fell down , fell down or disintegrated or moved to some other location
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... " but that he failed to follow through on that possibility. R . 297:146. He testified
that the hole on the ceiling "seemed like my most likely spot for that bullet hole"
and that having searched the entire room, they could not find any other place
where a bullet could have been. R. 297: 14 7. Arnn marked the spot on the wall
where the hole was, which was above the bed, where McCallie and Pearce
struggled. R. 297: 134--35; Def. Ex. 11. H e admitted it "didn't feel that it was that
important" to find the bullet in order to confirm Pearce's story. R. 297: 148.
Arnn interviewed Mr. IvicCallie and smelled the odor of alcohol on him
and believed him to be intoxicated. R. 297 :1 31-32. He did not do any sort of field
sobriety test or ever test IvicCallie's blood. R. 297 : 139-40. But McCallie had an
injury to his face that was bleeding. R. 297: 139, State's Ex. 6.

E. RECORDINGS
The State also played several j ail recordings from Ivfr. IvicCallie. In one
recording ,,vith Tim, IvicCallie said he thought he shot Tim and that he needed
Pearce "to say this was an accident." R. 298: 11 9. In a phone call to his mother,
IvicCallie said that Pearce would say the shooting was an accident. R. 298: 119.
Then in a later phone call to a Christy, Tim's daughter, IvicCallie asked her to
"get a little pushy" with Pearce, that "it'll be well worth [Pearce's] while" if he
cooperated and that he would "take care of him." R. 298: 11 9. In a later call,
McCallie said that "I'm going a different direction with the story now, it's selfdefense now sinceJohn doesn't want to play ball." R . 298:119.
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F. TESTIMONY OF JAMES MCCALLIE
Mr. McCallie testified that he had been driving a semi-truck that day and,
presenting his logs, showed that he arrived in Salt Lake City betvveen 8:30 and
9:00 pm that day. R. 298:33-34. H e said he stopped off at 7-11, picked up an 18pack of beer and then went to the bank. R. 298:34-35 . McCallie provided a receipt
sho-wing he pulled cash from an ATM for his rent at 10 pm. R. 298:33-35.
He got home and found Pearce there. R . 297 :36. The two were "becoming
friends" and so l\!IcCallie put his truck bag in his bedroom and began working on
his logs. R . 298 :37 -38. Pearce started talking with l\llcCallie about guns for 30-45
minutes, by ,,vhich time, McCallie had consumed two bee rs. R. 298:38 . He got up
to walk to his bedroom and show Pearce the gun. R. 298:38-39. H e pulled the gun
out of his dresser, set it on the bed then picked it up, unloaded it, walked out of the
bedroom and showed it to Pearce . R. 298:38-39. He then took the gun back to the
bedroom and began to load it when Pearce came back in. R. 298:39 . l\!Ir.
McCallie believed Pearce wanted to steal the gun, so McCallie asked him to leave,
then reloaded it and put it under his pillow to try to hide it from Pearce. R.
298:39-40.
He came back out and played guitar with Pearce, who kept asking him to
drink whiskey. R. 298:40. J'vlcCallie put the bottle to his lips to placate Pearce, but
did not drink, since he only drank hard , alcohol on his birthday. R. 298:40.
l\!IcCallie then took two beers into the shower with him, drank one of them and
had two other unopened beers on his nightstand. R. 298:41-42. He got dressed
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and Pearce came back the bedroom asking him to come out and do more shots. R.
298:42.
McCallie went back out and they played music and were a "little bit loud"
when Jody came out and was upset about being woken up. R . 298:43 . McCallie
called her names and said he'd be moving out. R. 298:43. Pearce demanded that
McCallie apologize, but he refused. R. 298:43-44. NicCallie went to the bedroom,
and Pearce came in, stood on NicCallie's feet with his fists clenched, demanding
that McCallie apologize. R. 298:45. McCallie reached behind him and grabbed
,

the gun with his left hand from under his pillow because he felt threatened. R .
298:45-46 . He told Pearce to leave the room .
That's when he grabbed the gun and he pinned my finger ·against
the frame of the gun. Well, when I pulled back on it, he fell over the
top of me and he had his finger in the trigger guard and in essence,
when he fell over the top of me, he pushed the trigger and fired the
weapon himself.
R. 298:46. Mc Callie denied ever threatening to kill Pearce. R . 298:4 7. He only to
Pearce he wanted him "out of my room." R. 298:4 7. 1-'IcCallie said he held the
gun's hammer back to prevent Pearce from firing or getting control of the weapon
and using it on him. R. 298:48-49.
McCallie testified that he put clothes on and ,went outside, where the police
took him to the ground and crushed his face into the pavement, cutting it. R.
298:52-53.

In regards to the phone calls, Mr. lVIcCallie testified that he called Tim and
pretended not to know so that he could hear his side of the story. R. 298:56 . In
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fact, Pearce told NkCallie's mother that the shooting was an accident. R. 298:5859. Christy told McCallie that Pearce wanted to be compensated and McCallie
agreed that he would help take care of him. R. 298:59, 66. But when Pearce said
he would no longer say it was an accident, McCallie had to say what happened,
which was that the gun vvas pulled in self-defense. R. 298:60.

G . OTHER DEFENSE WITNESSES

Dr. Robert Rothfeder testified for the defense . He reviewed Pearce's
medical records and found his blood alcohol level was at .31, four times the
presumptive level and that the attending physician described him as "heavily
intoxicated" when he arrived at the hospital. R. 298:6-7, 9. He testified that a
person with this BAG who did not regularly drink would be "non-functional" and
could not walk or talk. R. 298:8. A regular drinker would still be "significantly
impaired" such that he would have great difficulty thinking, understanding,
remembering, walking a straight line, or reasoning. R. 298:8. He believed a person
with that level of intoxication could possibly pull a handgun trigger consciously,
but that it would be questionable whether they could aim or operate it. R. 298: 18.
McCallie's mother, Carol Ibarra, testified that Pearce told her he "was very
sorry for what happened" and said "it was an accident ... " R. 298: 77. Pearce said
he wanted l\kCallie to give him "severance pay for the three days I was off work. "

R. 298: 7 7. He also said he did not want to press charges. R . 298: 79.

25

:Marjorie l\!Iaughan, a friend of Ibarra's, also testified that she heard Pearce
tell Ibarra that the shooting was an accident. R. 298 :80-81 .

H. THE EFFECTS OF A .31 BAC
As Dr. Rothfeder testified, the effects of a .31 BAC are staggering for
v,iitness comprehension. R. 298:6-18. They would have difficulty remembering or
doing anything that would be necessary to accurately recollect something that
happened, gwen their inability to reason, think, understand or remember. R.
298 :8.
"Alcohol impairs the ability to form new memories." 1 The "impact of
alcohol on memory formation

[i]s a dose-related continuum V\0.th mmor

impairments at one end and very large impairments at the other, with all
impairments representing the same fundamental deficit in the ability to store new
information in memory for longer than a few seconds." 2 As doses increase beyond
.15, "the resulting memory impairments can become much more profound,
sometimes culminating in blackouts, a complete inability to remember critical
elements of events, or even entire events, that transpired while intoxicated. " 3
According to one text, a BAC of .30 results in a "stuporous state." The
person would have the "inability to respond to stimuli" and would be "not likely to

l\!lARC GALANTER ET AL., ALCOHOL PROBLEMS IN ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG
ADULTS: EPIDEMIOLOGY, NEUROBIOLOGY, PREVENTION, A ~n TREATMENT 164
(2006) .
1

Id.
3 Id.
2
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remember events the next day." 4 A BAG not much higher, .35, would result in a
person being completely anesthetized. Id. "Stupor and unconsciousness are present
for many individuals who have BAG levels of .2 1 to .30. Marked central nervous
system depression occurs at levels abo ut .30, including decreased respiration and
heart rate

sometimes

resulting in

death. "

5

As

one

text

described

the

symptomology, a .31 is nearly fatal:
Level 4: From .15 to .30 BAG, the person is in a high-risk state. All
physical and mental functions are impaired considerably. The
person is unable to walk without help. Breathing is labored, body
temperature may go clown, and reflexes are depressed. There may
be a loss of bladder control. Tlze person does not know what he or size is
doing or saying and is unable to remember events. Loss of consciousness may
occur.
Level 5: Above a .30 BAC , a person is unconscious or in a coma.
The part of the brain that controls breathing and heartbeat is
dangerously affected. The p erson is close to death and could die
without medical attention. 6
Pearce admitted that he has consumed whiskey nearly ever day for thirtyfour years. R. 298:86-87. In fact, one of the most serious complications of longterm alcohol use , according to all th e research, is a significantly impaired
memory.

7

Those who use alcohol frequently have "poorer spatial working

RAYMO 1D GOLDBERG, DRUGS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM 126 (2013).
GARY L. FISHER & A ·cy A. ROGET, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE
PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND RECOVERY 57- 58 (2008).
6 VALERIE lVIENDRALLA & JANET GROSSHANDLER, DRINKING AI\JD DRIVING,
Now WHAT? 18 (2011 ) (emphasis added).
7 GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 126; jOHNjUNG, ALCOHOL, OTHER DRUGS, A1
"\JD
BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGICAL R ESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 203-04 (2009); lVIark S.
Goldman et al., ALcolwlism and J\!Iem01y: Broadening the Scope of Alcohol-Expectancy
Research, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 13 7 ( 1991 ); vVilliam vV. Beatty et al., Visuospatial
4

5
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memory"

and including an

inability

to

form

short-term

memones

or

"remembering recent events and learning new information." 8 Drinking over a long
period "shrinks the brain," killing tissue which leads "to widespread deficits in
cognition and behavior" including to deficits in working and long-term memory. 9
"Some people appear conscious and even function when they drink, but later, they
have no memory of what transpired. This condition, referred to as an alcoholinduced blackout, may be an early indication of alcoholism." 10

I. PEARCE'S EXTREMELY HIGH BAC AFFECTED HIS ABILITY TO
ACCURATELY PERCEIVE THE EVENTS

vVhile Pearce testified confidently, the evidence reflects that he could not
accurately perceive- if at all remember-the events given his high level of
intoxication. Pearce could not remember what clothes McCallie wore. R. 297:35.
Critically, he could not remember the exact date the shooting took place. He
remembered finding out in the hospital that it was April Fool's Day, "not a good
day to get shot," he said. R. 297:41-42. However, the shooting took place on the
early morning hours of 1\/Iarch 31, a day earlier than Pearce's recollection. R.
297:4-2. Therefore, it took Pearce almost 24 hours before he seemed to come out of

the alcoholic stupor.

Perception> Construction and Memory in Alcoholism, 5 7 J. STUD. ALCOHOL DRUGS 136
(1996).
8 J UNG, supra note 7, at 203- 04.
9 GREGORY FEIST ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: MAKING Co NECTIONS 266 (2009).
IO GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 126- 27.
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Pearce could not recollect any of the times and admitted he was only
"guessing" about specifics. R. 297:50. He believed NicCallie arrived around 3 pm
or sometime mid-afternoon. R. 297: 18-19, 23. However, Mc Callie provided
documentation, both from his trucking company, as well as store receipts, that
show he did not arrive until after 10 pm, seven hours later. R. 298:33-35, Def. Ex.
14. According to Pearce, he had been drinking for 10 hours before the shot went
off. R. 297 :33, 40. If Pearce arrived at 9 or 10 am, then the shot would have been
around 7 or 8 pm. Notably, police did not receive the 911 call until 5: 17 am, nine
hours after one of Pearce's recollections and five hours after the other. R. 297: 151.
Pearce did not perceive the weapon . H e did not recall ever seeing a gun
prior to the actual moment it was pointed at him. R. 297:49. He did not see Nlr.
NicCallie reach down to get it. R. 297:42 . Nor did Pearce see McCallie go do his
dresser or to the bed or pull the gun out of his waistband. R. 297:42.
Pearce admitted on cross-examination that "everything [was] calm and
everything [was] ok" before they walked into the bedroom, in contravention to his
statements that the two were arguing. R. 297 :44. Indeed, he told police officers on
April ·1st, just one day after the shooting, that NicCallie did not make any
statements before pointing the gun at him, in contradiction to his trial testimony.
R. 297:44-45. Pearce also told a detective that NicCallie said, "I'm going to kill
your ass" and "I'm just going to kill you," different statements than his testimony.
R.297:117.
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Perhaps most importantly, Pearce told police day after the shooting that "it
was all kind of a blur" and that "my memory isn't 100 percent on everything." R.
297:47. He also said, "You know, I can't remember exactly." R. 297:48. Pearce

testified that at the time he "was still-kinda things were still trying to sort thing
out, everything that had happened." R. 297:45.
Pearce admitted that he did not remember making some statements to the
police nor could he remember all of their questions, claiming that a day later he
was "still pretty shooken up ." R. 297:4-5-4-6. "I don't recall every question I was
asked that day," he said. R. 297:49. He said things became clearer later because
"once I had ... calmed down ... I was able to re-gather my thoughts and think
about exactly what had happened ... "R. 297 :46.

In reality, it wasn't that Pearce vvas under shock. According to the
literature, he would have had no or little ability to form a memory at all. vVhat this
reflects is that Pearce likely created these memories subsequently, when he was no
longer so highly intoxicated.

j.

PEARCE'S STORY DOES NOT MATCH THE EVIDENCE

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the inaccuracy of Pearce's memory
1s its failure to comport with the evidence at the scene. According to Pearce,
l\!IcCallie stood at the bed and that when he tried to push the gun down toward
the ground, it fired, which would have been directed out of the room in a
cl0vvnwarcl trajectory. Not only did police not find a bullet in that location or
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direction (or anywhere else in the house for that matter), but the only possible
location-a hole in the ceiling well inside the bedroom-was consistent with
McCallie's version of events. While the police did not find a bullet, the detective
admitted that the spot in the ceiling vvas the "most likely spot for that bullet hole"
and that it was "very possible" that the bullet fell clown the wallboard. R. 297: 14647. Pearce's story, then, does not make sense. If the hole in the ceiling was made
by the bullet, then it would have to travel downward through Pearce, turn around
and go backwards into the room and up to the ceiling, a physical impossibility.
Pearce's claim that lVIcCallie held the gun in his right hand was
contradicted by Tim's statement that McCallie had the gun in his left hand. R.
297 :60, 68-70, 80. It also contradicts McCallie's left-handedness. R. 297:60, 78.
Additionally, Pearce's story fails to account, at its most basic level, for where
the gun came from. Pearce could not recall where the gun came from-it just
suddenly appeared. See point II H. supra. But McCallie wore sweatpants, as
depicted in a police photograph. State's Ex. 6. It would be difficult for Mr.
lVlcCallie to carry that firearm in tho~e pants without Pearce noticing it. Indeed,
what makes more sense is McCallie's version that the gun was under the bed's
pillow and was pulled out in a moment of struggle.

K. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

The State needed to show sufficient evidence that Mr. McCallie committed
a 1) threat, 2) accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, 3) to do
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bodily injury to another, 4,) with a dangerous weapon, 5) and not in self-defense.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-1 02 , 76-5-103.
vVhile Pearce's testimony, if fully credited, amounts to sufficient evidence of
an assault, his extreme intoxication reveals that no reasonable jury could believe
his testimony and hence, the evidence was insufficient for that reason. T he State
did not have any independent evidence of guilt other than the testimony of a
person whom the literature states had a blood alcohol level that would almost
entirely impair his memory. Pearce's statements to police soon after reflect his
inability to remember what occurred and the evidence at the scene flatly
contradicts his story. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. McCallie
of aggravated assault.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Mr. McCallie requests that this court reverse his
aggravated assault conviction, given the prosecutor's comment on his invocation of
his right to silence and the insufficiency of the evidence against him.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _?J_\_ day of December, 2014.

SAlv/U~L P. NEvVTON
Attoi-rr~y for the Defendant/ Appellant
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Tab A

ADDENDUMA
Constitutional JP>irovisio:ns

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FIFTH AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital , or othervvi se
infamo us crime, unless on a presentm ent or indictment of a Grand
J ury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
M ilitia, when in actual service in time of , 1Var or public danger; nor
shall any perso n be su bj ect for th e same o ITense to be twice put in
j eop ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any crimin al case
to be a witn ess against himself, nor be deprived of life, libe rty, or
property, without due process of law; nor sh all priva te property be
taken fo r public use, withoutjust compensation .
SIXTH AMENDMENT

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him ; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defen(s)e.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTIO N

l

All pe rso ns born or naturalized in the U nited State. and subj ect to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State ,,.,,herein they reside. No State shall m ake or enfo rce any law
which shall abridge th e privileges or immunities of citizens of th e
United States; nor shall any State depri ve any person of life, liberty,
or propen y, ,,vithou t du e process of law; nor deny to any person
vvithin its jurisdiction th e equal pro tection o [ the laws.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE

Jr, SECTION 7 .

[DUE PROCESS OF LAW.]

No per on shall be deprived of li fe, liberty or property, without due
process ofl aw .
.ARTICLE

I, SECTION 12.

[RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]

In criminal prosecutions th e accused shall have the right lo appear
and de fend in p erson and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of th e accusation against him , to h ave a copy th ereof, to testify
in his own behalf, to be confron ted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
ovm behalf, to have a sp eedy pubJic trial by an impartial jury of the
county or di strict in which the offense is alleg d to h ave been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases .

Tab B

ADDENDUMB
Statutory and Rule Provisions

76-5-102 . Assault.
(1) Assaul t is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or viol ence, to do bodily mJury to
another;
(b) a Lhreal, accompanied by a show of immecliale force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful forc e or violence, that causes bodily
inj ury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person h as knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
ir~ury to another.

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
( l ) A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as
defined in Section 76-5-102 and u es :
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (I) is a third degree felony , except under
Subsection (2)(b ).
(b) A violation of Subsection (I) that results in serious bodily injury is a
second degree felony.

77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence.
\!\Then it appears lo the courl thal th ere is nol sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defe nse, it shaJl fo rtbvvitl order him discharged.

Utah R. Crim. P . 17 . The trial.
(a) In all cases th e defendant shall have the right to app ear and defend in person
and by counsel. T he defendant shall be p ersonally prese nt a t the trial with the
fo llowing exceptions:
( 1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions , defendant m ay consent in
writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death , the defend ant's voluntary
absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not
prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effe ct as if defendant had been prese nt; and
(3) T h e court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown
which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of th e prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on Lhe trial calendar to be tried in the following order:

(I) misdem eanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases ,,vhen defendant is in custody(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizan ce ; and
(4-) misdem eanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless Lhe defendant waives a jury in open
court with the approval of the co urt and the consent of the prosecuti on.

(cl) All olher cases sh all be tried vvithout a jury unless the defendant makes written
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders othervvise . No jury shall
be allowed in the trial of an infraction.

(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in
Section 78-46-5, U .C.A. 1953.

(0 In

all cases the pro ccution and defens e may, wi th lbe consenl of lhe accused

and th e approval of the court, by stipula ti on in ,,vriting or made orally in open
co urt, p roceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress ,vith any number of
j urors 1 ss than othen,vise required .
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the
fo llm,ving order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) T he prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may
make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;

(4·) ,Nhen the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for
good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) VVhen the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court
shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides vvithout
argument, the prosecution shall open the argurn.ent, th e defense shall follow and
the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. T he court may
se t reasonable limits upon the argumen t of counsel for each party and the time to
be allowed for argument.
(h) If ajuror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror
has been selected, the case shall proceed u ing the alternate juror. If no alternate
has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors
remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be di charged and a new trial ordered.
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a
witness as provided in this section.

(1 ) If the judge permits juro rs to submit questions, the judge shall control the
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial fi n der of fact and does
not beco me an investigative body. T he judge may disallow any qu estion from a
juror and may disconti nue questions Crom jurors a l any time.
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, th e judge should advise the
jurors that they may write th e question as it occurs to them and submit the
question to th e bailiff for transmittal to the judge. T he judge should advise the
jurors that some qu e ' lions might not be allowed .
(3) The judge shall reviev,, the qu estion with counsel and unrepresented parties and
rule upon any obj ection to th e question. T he judge m ay disallow a question even
tho ugh no objection is made . T h e j udge shall preserve the ,,vritten question in the
court file. If the question is allowed , the judge sh all ask the question or permit
co unsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. T h e question may be rephrased into
proper form. T he judge sh all allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine
the ,vitness after the juror's qu estion .

U) \1\Then in the opinion of the co urt it is proper for the jury to view the place in
which the offense is all eged to have been committed, or in which a ny other
material fact occurred, it m ay order them to be conducted in a body under the
charge of an office r to the place, whi h shall be sh own to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. T h e officer sh all be sv,,orn that v.rhile the
jury are thu s conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so
appointed to speak to them nor to do so him self on any subj ect connected 'With the
trial and to return them into court vvithout unnecessary delay or at a specifi ed
time.
(k) At each recess of the co urt, whethe r the jurors are permitted to separate or are
sequeste red, they shall be admonished by the co urt that it is th eir duty not lo
converse among themselves or to converse wi th , or suffer themselves to be
add ressed by, any other person on any subject of th e trial , and that it is th eir duty

not to form or express an op1mon thereo n until the case

1. ·

finally submi tted to

them.

(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, th e j u ry may take vvith them the instructions of
the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, excep t exhibits
tha t shoul d n ot, in the opinion of th e co urt, be in the possession of the jury, such as
exhibits of un usual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to
vi ew exhibits up on request. J urors are en titled Lo take n otes during th e trial and to
h ave those notes with them during delib erations. As necessary, the

ourt shall

provide juro rs with writing materials and instru ct the jury on taking and usmg
notes.
(m) vVhen th e case is fi nally submitted to the jury, they sh all be kept toge ther in
some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict
or are discharged , unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the
court, the officer having th em under hi s charge sh all not allow any communication
to be made to them , or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed
upon their verdict, and h e sh all not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate
to any person the stale of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation , if they desire to be inform ed on any
p oint of law arising in th e cause, they shall inform th e officer in charge of them ,
,,vbo shall communicate such reques t to the court. T h e court may th en direct that
the jury be brought before the court where, in the pr sence oft.he defendant and
both counsel, the ourl shall respond to th e inquiry or advise th e jury tha t no
fur th er instru ctions shall be given . Such resp onse shall be recorded. T he court may
in its discre ti on respond to the inquiry in vvriting vvithout having the jury brought
b efore th e court, in vvhich case the inquiry and t.hc respon e therelo shall be
en tered in the record.
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is inco rre Lon its face, it may be co rrec ted by
the jury under the advice of th e co urt, or the jury m ay be sent out again.

(p) At th e co nclusion or the evidence by tbe prosecution, or at the co nclusion of all
the evidence, the court m ay issue an ord er dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof upon Lh gro und tha l the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense ch arged the rein or any lesser included offense.
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ADDENDUMD
Motion for New Trial

SCOTT A. WILSON, # 10486
A11orneyjbr Defendc1111
SA LT LAKE LEG AL DEFEl\!DER AS SO CIAT ION
424 East 500 So ut h, Sui te 300
Sa lt Lake Ci ty, UT 84 11 l
Tel ephone: (80 1) 532-5444
fN THE THlRD OJSTRICT COU RT, STATE OF UTAH
lN AND FO R SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
PURSUANT TO RULE 24 OF UTAH

Pla intiff,

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

vs .
Case No. 131903319

JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLJE
Defend ant.

JUDGE DENISE LINDBERG

Comes the Defe ndant by counse l, Scott Wilson, and moves the Court to order a nevi trial for
the fo ll o\-vi ng reasons:

1. The prosecutor commen ted on th e Defendant's ri ght to remain silent when he was arrested
for the offe nses in thi s info rmati on. The Defenda nt refused to answer the questions of the
po li ce whe n he was arrested. That refusa l was tantamo unt to invok in g hi s ri ght to remain
si lent und er th e constitutions of Utah and the United States. In spite of the Defendant' s
basic and obv ious righ t to rem ain sil en t, the prosecut or co mmented on hi s fai lure to provide
the police with the reaso ns for the shooti ng. During th e closing argument the prosecutor
told the j ury that the Defendant had tri ed to get the alleged victim to say th at the shooting
was an accident. He vve nl on lo say that whe n the alleged victim refused to endorse th at the
shooting was an accident , that the Defendan t then we nt to the self-protecti on defense. In
order to bolster that con ten tion and sway the j ury into believ ing that lhe Defe nd an t was
fabricating a defe nse, he stated that the Defend ant did not tell the pol ice \vhen he \Vas

arrested that he had acted in se lf-protection or that lhe shooting was an accident. Defense
counsel immediately objec ted and moved for a mistrial. The objection and motion fo r a
mistrial we -c den ied. The Defen dant's righ t to a fa ir tri al was denied by the prosec utor's
arg ument to the jury. The Defendant's right ro a fai r trial was fu rther prejud iced by the
fa ilure of the Court to provi de a corrective instruction to the jury. Therefore, the jury \Vas
led to believe that the prosecutor's argument was legitimate and that they could rely upon it
in making their decision.
2. The Defendant was lound not guilty of the most serious charge of Discharge of a Firearm, a
felony 2. He was found guilty of Aggravated Assault, a felony 3, after the jury deliberated
for a considerable amount of time. The jury sent two questions to the Court. Although the
Court correctly answered the questions, they showed that the jury was confused and in
doubt about ,,vhat they were to co nsider in their deliberations. The prosecutor's argument
to the jury that the Defendant's defenses were a fabr ication because he fai led to tell the
police about them and the fai lure to correct that argument vio lated the Defendant's ri ght to
a fair tri al. Those errors pushed the jury in the direc ti on of finding the Defendant gui lty of
the aggravated assau lt. The prosecutor's case hinged on the jury believing the all eged
victim over the testimony of the Defendant. They were the on ly witnesses to the shooting.
The physical ev idence or where a bullet hole was found was inconsistent with the
testimony of the al leged victim, but consi stent \•Vith the testimony of the Defendant.
Therefore, the prosecutor had to impugn the Defendant and his testimony in order to
convince the jury of guilt. He did that by stating that ii' his test imony and defenses were
wor th y of belief that he would have told the police when he was arrested. The j ury was left
with that be lief when there v,ias no correcrive instruction. The jury simply fo llov,1ed that
argument to a verdict or guilty on one of the two offenses before them.

RESPECTFU LLY submi tted this 30th day of December, 20 13.

/S/ SCOTT A. WILSON
SCOTT A. WILSON
Artorney for Defendonr

MAI LED/DELIVER!:]) a copy of the fo regoing Mot ion lo Clint Heiner at the office of the

Distri ct Attorn ey, 111 East Broadway, Sui te 400, Sa lt Lake City , Utah, 8411 1 this 30th day
Dec ember, 20 13.

or
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ADDENDUME
State's Response to Motion for New Trial

SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CLINT HEINER, Bar No. 11905
Deputy District Attorney
11 1 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone : (801) 363-7900

!½
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

-vs-

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT
TO RULE 24 OF UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

)
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE,

)
Defendant.

Case No. 131903319
Hon. DENISE LINDBERG

Clint Heiner, Deputy District Attorney, and Attorney for the State, hereby requests that
Defendant's Motion For New Trial be denied.
DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _~ , 2013.
SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
By:

I-

Facts

During the State's closing argument, the State argued that Defendant' s theory
about what had occurred on the night in question had changed and Defendant's
testimony at trial was not credible. At trial, Defendant testified that shotting John
(Victim) was in self-defense. To point out to the jury that Defendant's claim of selfdefense was not credible the State pointed out that Defendant's story changed
multiple times.
The State argued, in one jail call Defendant did not even know who he shot and
did not remember anything. In another jail call Defendant told his mother to
convince John to state that this was an accident. Then after Defendant was not
successful in getting John to say it was an accident, Defendant decided to claim selfdefense because John was "not playing ball." Finally, the state argued that Defendant
was given an opportunity to tell the police what had occurred on the night in question
and instead of saying it was an accident or that it was in self-defense, as he claimed at
trial, Defendant was confused why police were even there and told them "nothing
happened" (Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent at this point). When
the state made this argument Defendant objected, requested a mistrial, and at a
minimum that a corrective instruction be given to the jury. All three requests were
denied. Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Assault.
Defendant now requests a new trial. In his motion, Defendant argues that the
State's statement in closing argument was a comment about Defendant's right to
remain silent which was improper and denied Defendant a fair trial. Defendant also

contends that the Court should have provided a corrective instruction to the jury to
advise the jury that the State's argument was improper.

H·

Law
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 24, Motion for new trial states:
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party
(emphasis added).

If a constitutional error is substantial and prejudicial to the extent that there is a
reasonable probability that it affected the reliability of the trial outcome, then a new
trial is required. State v. Maas, 991 P.2d 1108 (Utah App.,1999). The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits use of a defendant's post- Miranda
silence for impeachment purposes. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah.App.,1998).

III-

Argument
Here, the State agrees that Defendant has a right to remain silent; however, he
didn't. Defendant made a statement to the police that "nothing happened" and then
he made different statement~_to different people, (i.e. he did remember anything and it
was an accident), and then at trial made a totally different statement (i.e. that it was
self-defense). This is proper argument and was properly argued to show that
Defendant is not credible and his claim of self-defense should not be believed.
Because the argument was proper, no corrective instruction was required.

llV.

Conclusion
Because the State's argument was proper no corrective instruction was required;
therefore, Defendant's motion for new trial should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this llt'1aay of

s!iXI~,

SIM GILL
District Attorney

201/'f
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ADDENDUMF
Ruling and Order on Motion for New Trial

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff(s),

MINUTE ENTRY RULING &
ORDER
CASE NO. 1319033 19
Judge Denise P. Lindberg

vs.
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE,

Date: 10th February 2014

Defendant( s),

Motion for new trial is DENIED. The Court first notes that the transcript provided by
defense counsel is only a partial transcript of the State's rebuttal argument. As such, it's difficult
to evaluate the full context of the claimed wrongdoing by the prosecutor. But, even with this limited
record, the Court concludes that the prosecutor's comment on rebuttal was an appropriate comment
on the credibility of defendant's testimony, given the inconsistencies in defendant's prior statements
to the police and others.
The Court disagrees with defense counsel's argument that defendant's alleged "refusal" to
answer questions was "tantamount to invoking his right to remain silent." The right to remain silent
must be invoked unequivocally. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). The evidence
in this case was that defendant was not cooperative, but did make statements to the police on the date
of the incident.

So ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2013

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify tha t a copy of the at tached document was sent to t h e
following p eople for case 131903319 by the me t h od and o n t h e date
spec if ied .
MAIL :
84121
MAIL :
84111
MAIL:

J AMES CHRIS TOPHER MCCALLIE 1938 NUNLEY CIRCLE HOLL~.DAY, UT
CLINT T HEINER 111 E BROADWAY STE 4 00 SALT
SCOTT A WILSON 424 E 500 s STE 300 SALT
02/ 11 /2014

LAKE CITY

LAKE CITY

/s/ AMY BAUGHMAN

Date :
Deputy Court Cl erk

Printed: 02/11/14 16:20 : 20
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ADDENDUMG
Selected Treatises

TAB LE 6 .1 Approximate Blood Alcohol
Concen l r'Ol ions
Body Weigtit (pounds)

"'

Drinks

100

120

140

160

180

··

200

220

240
.02
.03

(per hour)

,

.04

.03

.03

.02

.02

.02

.02

2

.08

.06

.05

.05

.04

.04

.03

3

.11

.09

.08

.07

.06

.06

.05

.05

4

.15

.12

.11

.09

.08

.08

.07

.06

5

.19

.16

.13

.12

.11

.09

.09

.08

6

.23

.19

.16

.14

.13

.11

.1 0

.09
.11

7

.26

.22

.19

.16

.15

.1 3

.12

8

.30

.25

.2 1

.1 9

.17

.15

.14

.13

9

.34

.28

.24

.21

.19

.17

.1 5

.14

10

.38

.3

.27

.23

.21

.19

.17

.1 6

Sou,ce Disti lled Sp1rr ls Council oi the United Slates.

TABLE 6 .2 Effec ts ot Alcohol o1 Varying Blood
Alcoho l Conce n trations

''eAc ·· · · ..... , ., .. "...... ·· ........ efh!c.is' - ·
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go
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0.1 0%

Slower reaction time; impaired muscle
co ntrol: reduced visual and audito ry acui l y:
legal into xi cation in most states

0.15%

Distorted perception and judgment;
impaired mental and physical functions;
less responsi ble behavior

0.20%

Markedly affe cted psyc homotor ability;
difficulty stayi ng awake

0.25 %

Inability o stand without help ; grossly
attecte d ab ili ty to comprehend

0.30%

Stu porous sta te; inability to respond lo
sti muli; 1 ot likely to remember events the
nex day

0.35%

Complete ly anesthetized; 1 % will die at this
SAC

0.40 %

State o f unconsc iousness or coma: half will
fatally ov erd ose without medical in terve ntio n

"'is' - - - - -

C,

~~

Less alert; less inhi bited ; s lightly irnpaited
jud gme l ; slight euphoria

3

,ii
u

•

0.05%

0.50%

g

Deep coma or complete unconsciousness
if not already d ead

Effects of Alcohol
A lcoho l accounts for 10% of all deaths in the United
States each yea r, a nd th e life expectancy of an alcoho li c is reduced by 15 yea rs. lt affects every orga n in
the body. Two important factors th at determine h ow

126

Chapter 6

Alcohol

alco h ol a ffects the bod y are frequency o f use a:1d
gu anrity consumed . The type of alcohol consumed
does n ot ma tte r. In a study of m al e a n d female
adolescents, beer, wine , and distilled spir it s p r o d uced equa lly damag ing physica l impairme nt.8 3 l n
th is section, we will exa mine the acme and chronic
effects of alcohol on the bra in , li ver, gas troi n tes tin al
trac1, card iovascular system, and immune system,
as we ll as th e rela tio nship t etween a lcoh o l and
c a nc er F igu re 6.3 illu str ates the effects of a lcohol
o n various body systems .
The defin ition of modera te d n n king for me1 is
110 m o re than two alco ho li c dri nks per day, and for
wo men, it is no more thai. one alco holic dr ink per day .
Light drinking would be le ss tha n th is amou nr. T he r e
is no stand ard defin iti on ofheaYy d r inking _, although a
commo nly accepted number fo r bi:1ge d rin king is consu mptio n of five or more drinks a t one sitting !or men
and four o r more drinks for women at o ne sitting .

Alcoho l and the Brain
The brain is h ighly sensiti ve to the effects of alcohol.
F ive 10 s ix d ri n ks dai ly w ill adversely effec t cog n it iv(' functi n in g. T he extent o f imp airment increases
with high er levels of consump tion . An esti m ated 15%
to 30% o f all nursing h om e p ati e nts a re ad rni tte I bec ause of permanent alcoh o l-induced bra in rla m age. 8 ·1
Alcoho l ac ts o n the cerebrum, a ffec tin g jud g m en t,
reason in g, and inhibiti o ns. It sti mul ates the release of
sero on in, whi ch could accoum for the d isinh ibiti n g
effect of alc oh ol.
Alcohol acting o n th e cerebral cortex affects moto r activi ty, a nd moods ch ange quickJ y. Alcohol stimul ates the relea se of d opamin e, accou nting for fe elings
of pleasu re or euphor ia. T he senses a r e impai red
whe n alcoh o l affects the cerebe llum . Many alcohol ics experience memory loss and difficu lty wirh prob lem-so lving and clecision -m ak in g. 85 At some level of
consump ti on of alcohol, the me du ll a is sedated to tile
p in t that respiration c ou ld stop. J\ report released
fr m the National Institute on Dru g Abuse states that
autopsy s1ud ies show ch ro me alcohol use sh rin ks rhe
brain especially in women. 86
Alth oug h drin~-jng sm all amou nts of alcoho l da il y
d oes no t affect memo ry adverse ly, occasio na l large
amounts cou ld harm memory . A study of te enagers
in the U nite d K ingdom fou nd that th ose who used
c:--.:c1::ssivc amoun ts of a lcohol suffered fro m m emo ry
prob lems. 87 Simila rl y, U. S. mi ddle-sc h oo l students
experienced memory loss afte r d . in king. 88
Alcohol-ind u ced amnes ia usu ally las ts a short
time . Some peop le ap pea r conscious a n d even fu n ctio n when th ey d rin k, but later, they ha e no memory
o f what transpired . This co n ditio n, r eferr ed to as a n
a lcohol-ind uce d b lacko ut, m ay be an ea rl y indication

Brain and central nervous system

Gastrointestinal tract

• Damages and eventual!} destroys
brain cells
• Impairs memory
• Dulls senses
• Irnpai rs physical coordi nati "'l
Ai,ects Judgrne.nl, reasoning,
and 1nn1bitions

• Causes inilammation
• May c ause cancer
• Lead s to pancreatitis
Hearl

• lv1ay rai,e blood pressure
• Causes irreg ular heartbeat
• Causes conditions including
card iomyopathy, AHMD. ischemrc heart
disease. and cerebrovascular
disorders (e g .. stroke)

Immune syslem

•

owers res istance
to disease

.,

Stomach and Intestines

~

• Causes bleed'ng and inflamrnat1on
• lv1ay trigger cancer

,s:;

~':
..... ~

Ol 0)

!if'-:
0 0,
~~

Rep roductive system
{female shown)
:g
• In women , menstrual cycles become irregular:
3: ';
pregnant women have an increased risk of bearin g
children with bi rth de fects
§0
~~
• In men. hormone levels may be al tere d:
~8
impotence may occur, testic les may atrophy

s:

• Damages and eveniually
de troys liver cells
• Caus«s medical con itions
including fatty liver,
alcohol hepatitis.
and cir rhosis

i

d

j

~~

Fi gure 6 .3 Effects of Alcohol Use on Body Systems Over Time

of alcoholism. Ginally, prenatal exposu re of the fe tus
to alcoho l possibly affec ts its attention an d memor y
for th e lo ng te rm even with no more drnn o ne drink
per day. 89
One condition resu lting from chro ni c alcohol
abuse is \'v'ernicke-Korsakoff syndrom e, which occurs
in about 20% of chronic alcoh ol users. Th is syn d rome
develops because alcohol impe des the body's abil ity
to utilize th iamine, one of the B vitamins. \\> The pe rso n with th is diso rd er is able to remember events o r
facts learned early in life but unable to recal l recent
events o r facts. Other charac teristics of th is disease
a re disorientati o n, nerve damage, poor co o rdination,
and rapid h orizonta l eye movement.
Chronic alco hol use is associated with neurotic
an d psychotic sy 111p to111s r anging fro m depressive
reactions to general ize d a nxiety dis orders and panic
attacks. One study rep orted diat about 20% of p ople
diagnosed wid1 a m ood or anxiety disorde r were alcohol ic."1 Du t ch you ths aged 12 to 18 wh o engaged
in binge drin king experienced highe r rates of mental
health pro blems.92
Among college students, th o se who have higher
leve ls of social a n. ·i ety are more likely to co nsume
alcoh ol. 9 ' Adolescents wid1 m o od d isorders who
self- med ica te w ith alcohol and other drugs are m ore
likely to exacerba te the ir prob le ms and may be at
great r ris k fo r suicide. 9 • Clinical depression is com mon. Depressed adolescents arc mo re likely to drink
a lcoho l and use other drugs t h an n onde pres sed

adolescents. 95 It is unclear if alcohol abuse leads to
depression or if depression leads to alcohol abuse.
Nonetheless, one-third to one -hal f of alcoholics
exhib it symptoms of depression at some time . Treating
dep ression could help preve nt relapse in recovering
alcoholics .

Alcohol and the Liver
C hronic alco hol co n sumptio n increases the risk for
ca ncer in 111any orga n s, includin g th e liver. 96 Because
the liv er is the m ain si te of metabol is m of alcohol,
heav y alcohol use can have devastating effe cts on
that organ. T h e thre e mai n conditions assoc iated
with overuse of alco h ol are fatty liver, alcohol hepatitis, a nd ci rrh osis. If one al r eady h as hepatitis C, th en
alc oh ol will e:,acerbate the condition, r esul ting i n a
shorter lifespan . T he mean age of death for wo men
wit h h epa titis C who d rink heavily is re duced from
61. 0 years to 4 9 .1 years. T he comparable reduction
fo r males is 55. J yea rs to 50.0 years . 97 Cirrhosis is
irre versible, eve n if alcoho l use sto ps. Some signs of
fatty li ver are evident in 90% to 100% of heavy drinkers, whereas 10% co 35% develop alcoh ol h e patitis,
and 10% to 20% deve lo p cirrhosis. 9 8 Fatty li ver can
de velo p \ ,i d1in a few days of heavy drinki ng . Sy 111ptoms of alcoh o l h epatitis inc lude jau n dice (a yellowish skin co lor), fatigue, low-g rade feve r, reduced
appeti te, da rk urine , and occasiona l vo miting and
nausea .
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Chapte r Nine

intoxicatioA
A transient state of physical
and psychological
disruption caused by the
presence of a toxic
substance, such as alcohol,
in the CNS.

One point about alcohol's acute effects is th at alcohol generally acts on the body as
a depressant, and its acu te effects are proportional to the magnitnde o f the BAC. Simply put, as the BA.C incre,1ses, acute effects incre.1se in number ,111d intensity. HO\\-e\·er,
how humans experience some degree o f into xication ;.111d bc:!1a\·c 1111der different
do ses of alcohol 111,1y be mo dified by psychological and situational facto rs JS well ,1s
,1lcoho l dose ,111d toler,1nce to this drug. Fo r so me be ha\'iors, these nondrng factors
may be C\'Cll more pom:rful de tennin;.1ms o f alco hol's acute effects than drug factors.

Physiological Effects

REM sleep

Acronym for ··rapid eye
movements," which are
associated with dream
activity and are one stage in
a cycle of sleep

•

hladcout
Fai lure to recall events that
occurred while d rinking
even though there is no loss
of consciousness
short--tl!nn memori,
Memory for recent events:
thought to d iffer from longterm memory ,n several
important ways
long-term memori,
Memory for remote events.
According to o n e t heory of
memory, information enters
long-te rm memo ry thro ugh
short-term memory

,-\!coho! t,1ken ,1t low doses has se\'eral physiologic:d effects. 1 Alcohol inhibits the secre tion of the an tidiuretic hormone, which Gn1ses increased urination. T he effect happens
when the R:\C is risi ng but not when it is falling . .-\!coho! ;1lso reduces the amount of
body fat that is oxidized . This .,cute effect of ,1lcohol .1ecumubtes to resu lt in lo11grcr111 increased body fat and weigh t gain when ;.1lco hol is used in ;.1ddition to normal
food inta ke (Suter, Scl111tz, & Jequier, 1992 ). Such weight gain is commonly called ,1
" beer belly." Alcohol is ,1 peripher,1! d ilator ,1nd c.rnses the skin to feel warm ;1nd turn
red. 1\ n nmbcrofauthors ha\'C C;.,Htioned ag;.1inst nsing ;.1lcoholic bc\'cragcs to \\·arm up
in cold en\·ironments. This Jd\'ice is CO\lnterintuitive tO many d rinkers, who experience
the warmth th,1t occurs \\·ith peripher,1! dibtion and know of the S.1int Rern.1rd and its
keg of brandy rescuing \"ictim s in sno\1·-con.:red mountains. Alcohol's dilating effect 011
peripheral blood \·essels c.rnses some lo ss of body heat, howe\·er, and such action was
tho ught to ultim,1tely decrease protection ,1gai11 st the cold. I t turns 0llt the problem is
not a serious one, :.is experimental studies ha\·e shown that alcohol docs not signifi cantly t ilt the babnce o f the body's temperarnre regulation in cold e1wironments.
An ,1cute .1lcohol effect with wide pr.1ctical applic:ition is th:it it increJses gast ric secretion, which is one basis for the U .S. cockt,1il hour. The increase in gastric secretion
stimulates the appetite. U nfor tunately, ,1lcohol at high doses ha rms the stomach mucos,1 .1nd causes gastric distress. Nause.1 .1nd \'Omiti ng nu y occ11r :it Ri\Cs greater than
0.1 5%. Anothe r physiological effect of alcohol when take n in high doses and when the
B.'\C increases rap idly is a rele,1se of corticosteroids , part of the body's general re.,ction
to stress. In this case, the stressor is a high dose of ,1lcohol, which is toxic to the body.
An import.mt ;.1cutc effect of alcohol is disruption of sleep patterns. Even ;.1 t lo\\"er
doses , alcohol suppresses REM sleep, which is the stage of the sleep cycle when most
dre,1ming occnrs (REM stands for " r..ipid eye 1110 \'ements," \\"hich char.1cterize this
stage of sleep). W hen the dose is IO\\·, RE.\1 sleep is snpprcsscd only in t he first half of
the night, but REM time reboHnds and incre.1ses in the second half. .-\t larger do ses of
.1lcoho!, REM sleep is suppressed thro ughout the night.
Alcohol imp:.lirs memory. Its acure effects a rc on short-term memory, and when
hig h RACs are reached rapidly, a blacko ut may o ccur. Blacko uts are an indi\'idual's
,rn, nesia abom evenrs when drinking, e\'e n tho ugh t here \\"JS 110 loss of consciousness .
for example , :.i person \\"ho had :i lot ro d rin k rhc night before may \\"ake up ;.1nd ha\·e
absolutely no reco llection o f where he or she parked the c.1r. Bl:ickouts are thought to
result fro m ,1 fai lure in the tr,111sfer o f in fo rmation in short-term m emory to longterm memo ry. Animal stndies snggcst th;.,t the mechanism for this effect is alcohol ' s
interference with receptors in the brai n that enhance connec tions among neurons and
:ire fnndament:il to le,1rning,1 nd memo ry (T okuda, Izumi , & Zorumski, 2011). People
also h;.1\·c "grayouts," in \\"hich they c;.111 partially recall e\'ents that occurred in fu ll

'Much of the d iscussion of alcohol's acute effects is based on Becker et al. (1975), Jacobs and Fehr (1987),
McKim (2000), and Sobell and Sobel I (1981).
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almost infinite diversity of symptoms that may ensue from the action of this single toxic agent." ln addition to impairing balance, motor coordination, decision
making, and a long list of other functions, alcohol impairs the ability to form
new memories. Alcohol primarily disrupts the ability to form memories that are
explicit in nature, including memories for focts (e.g., names, phone numbers,
etc.) and events (e.g., what you did last night) (Lister et al., 1991). lhe impact of
alcohol on the formation of new long-term explicit memories is far greater than
the drug's impact on the ability to recall previously established memories or to
hold ne\v information jn memory for a fe\v seconds. When intoxicated subjects
are asked to repeat new information immediately after its presentation or followjng short delays (e.g., a fev,1 seconds), they often do fine (see Ryback, 1971,
for an early revie·w). Similarly, subjects typically do quite well at retrieving
information acquired prior to acute intoxication. In contrast, intoxicated subjects have great difficulty storjng new information across delays lasting rn.ore
than a few seconds, particularly if they are distracted bet,veen the stimulus
presentation and testing. For instance, Acheson et al (1998) observed that intoxicated subjects coi1ld recall items on words lists jmmediately after the lists \Vere
presented, but had great difficulty recalling the i terns 20 n,jnutes later.
Ryback characterized the impact of alcohol on memory formation as a
dose.related continuum with mi.nor impairments at one end and very large
impairments at the other, with all impairments representing the same fundamental deficit in the ability store new information in memory for longer than a
few seconds. Consistent with this view, research indicates that the magnitude
of alcohol-induced memory impairments increases with dose but the same
general pattern, greater difficulty forming new memories than recalling existing memories, remajns. When doses of alcohol are small to moderate,, such as
those producing blood alcohol concentrations below 0.15%, memory impairments tend to be small to moderate, as \vell. At these levels, alcohol produces
what Ryback (1971) referred to as cocktail party memory deficits, lapses .in
memory that one might experience after having a few drinks at a cocktail party,
often manifested as "problems reme.mberjng what the other person said or
where they were in conversation." Several studies have revealed dHficulty
forming memories for items on word lists or learnir1g to recognize new faces at
these doses. As the doses jncrease, the res1.1ltjng memory impairments can.
become much more profound, sometimes culminating in blackouts, a complete
inability to remember critical elements of events, or even entire events, that
transpired \Vhile intoxicated (White et al., 2002a).

4. Mechanisms Underlying Alcohol-Induced Memory Impairments
Until recently, a lack of knm-vledge regarding the neuropharmacological
effects of alcohol hampered progress toward ru1 understanding of the mechanisms imderlying alcohol-induced memory impairments. Alcohol was long
assumed to affect the brain in a very general way, causjng a ubiquitous
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self-confident, his or her reaction time, judgment,
senses, and movement are impaired.
•

Level 3: When the blood alcohol content reaches .08
to .1 5 percent, the person is in a risky state. Thoughts
can become muddled, and speech can become slurred.
Vision and hearing are affected as well. Balance,
coordination, and muscle control are impaired,
sometimes resulting in a staggered walk. The indi vidual may have nausea or vomiting. At or above .08
BAC, a person is considered lega lly intoxicated .
Driving with a BAC of .08 or greater is illegal for
adults older than twenty-one in the United States. It
is unlawful fo r drivers under twenty-one to have any
amount of alcohol in their blood.

•

Level 4: From . ·1 5 to .3 0 BAC, the person is in a highrisk sta te. All physical and mental functions are
impaired considerably. The person is unable to wal k
without help. Breathing is labored, body temperature
may go down, and reflexes are depressed. There may
he a loss of bladder control. The person does not
know what he or she is doing or saying and is unab le
to remember events. Loss of consciousness may occur.

•

Level 5: Above a .30 BAC, a person is unconscious or
in a coma. The part of the brain that contro ls breathing and heartbeat is dangerously affected . The person
is close to death and could die wi thout medica l
attention.

